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1. Introduction. A primary aim of neuroscience is to understand how neural activity gives 
rise to behavior. Neuroscientists have long supposed that by interfering with the activity 
of brain circuits, synapses, cells or molecules and tracking the effects of those 
interventions on behavior, they can establish which structures are causally implicated in 
which behaviors. The recent “optogenetic revolution” in neuroscience has served to 
increase confidence in the merits of this approach. Optogenetic techniques, developed by 
Karl Diesseroth and colleagues (Boyden et al. 2015), allow neuroscientists to use 
genetically encoded proteins to make selected populations of neurons sensitive to light. 
Optical stimulation is then used to non-invasively turn these neurons on and off with 
millisecond precision in awake-behaving animals and investigate the impact on behavior. 
Hailed as the “method of the year” in the journal Nature in 2010, optogenetic techniques 
were rapidly implemented in research laboratories around the world (See for example 
Bickle 2016) and immediately began to generate exciting results, most notably that they 
could be used to induce false memories in rats (See for example Ramirez, Tonegawa and 
Liu 2014; See also Robins 2016). In fact, insofar as the techniques have set a new 
standard for “making causal links between elements of neural circuits and behavior” 
(Adamantidis et al. 2015, 1207; See also Häusser 2014), their incorporation into research 
studies in combination with other techniques has become a benchmark for publication in 
systems and behavioral neuroscience.  
 In this paper, I use a case study to demonstrate that optogenetic techniques will only 
illuminate causal links between the brain and behavior to the extent that their error 
characteristics are known and developing this knowledge requires methodological and 
perspectival pluralism. Optogenetic techniques have been described as “revolutionary” 
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for the unprecedented causal control they allow neuroscientists to exert over neural 
activity in awake behaving animals. Yet, the techniques have been introduced into 
domains of neuroscience where it is common for investigators to intervene at a single 
locus in the brain and track a select set of changes in behavior without adequate 
consideration of neural events downstream of the manipulation or a detailed analysis of 
behavior (See for example Sullivan 2010; Krakauer et al. 2017). It is argued by appeal to 
the case study that this “reductionistic perspective” disables scientists from appreciating 
the errors to which novel tools like optogenetics may be subject when they are used to 
test causal hypotheses linking the brain to behavior. Using the case study, I show that 
identifying such errors requires, (1) a comparison of optogenetic techniques with 
techniques having well known error characteristics (“methodological pluralism”), and (2) 
a consideration of the broader neural and behavioral context in which the locus of an 
optogenetic intervention is situated (“perspectival pluralism” (e.g., Giere 2006; Sullivan 
2016)).  
 I begin, in Section 2, with a preliminary appraisal of optogenetic techniques, 
comparing them with more traditional intervention techniques used in systems and 
behavioral neuroscience. In Section 3, I describe a research study that challenges the idea 
that optogenetics alone is poised to shed light on how neural circuits give rise to 
behavior. Appealing to a set of conceptual tools from the philosophical literature on 
scientific experimentation and pluralism in Section 4, I evaluate the research study and 
derive some general lessons about the necessity of methodological and perspectival 
pluralism for progress in understanding causally complex systems in neuroscience.   
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2. What is Revolutionary About Optogenetics? A primary aim of neuroscience is to 
determine how the brain gives rise to or causes behavior. One standard investigative 
approach is to train non-human animals (e.g., rodents) on cognitive tasks/in experimental 
learning paradigms as a means to produce detectable changes in behavior and to use 
either transient or permanent intervention techniques to alter neural activity before, 
during or after training to assess the impact on behavior. James Woodward’s (2003) 
manipulability-based account of causation nicely captures the interventionist approaches 
operative in such experiments (See also Craver 2007). An investigator ideally aims to 
intervene in a single variable and establish that the variable is necessary for the behavior 
under normal conditions. If she observes the relevant behavioral differences between an 
experimental and a control group, she infers that the manipulated variable is “causally 
responsible for” or “implicated in the production of” the behavioral changes of interest.   
 In order to convey why optogenetics is a “revolutionary” intervention technique, it is 
relevant to briefly describe the traditional intervention techniques that it has to a 
significant extent come to replace. Lesioning, for example, was at one time considered to 
be the best method for intervening in brain activity. Put simply, lesioning involves the 
selected removal of brain tissue in an anesthetized animal before or after training in an 
experimental paradigm. One disadvantage of this method is that it is temporally crude; 
animals must go through a recovery period after surgery, which may allow sufficient time 
for so-called “plastic” changes in neural networks, synapses, cells and molecules to take 
place. Such changes, insofar as they are difficult to detect, serve as confounding variables 
in the attempt to establish causal links between the brain and behavior. Given the 
possibility of such changes, it is widely accepted that an animal with a brain lesion should 
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not be regarded simply as a normal animal minus the brain area that has been removed, as 
another area may subserve recovery of that function (e.g., von Melchner et al. 2000). 
Lesions are also spatially crude; it is difficult to ensure that the intended brain area has 
been removed completely or to tell if the surrounding tissue also has been damaged. 
These features can only be verified via post-mortem analysis (See Bechtel and 
Stufflebeam 2001 for further discussion).  
 Investigators can also knock out genes in laboratory mice by replacing or disrupting an 
existing gene, thereby inactivating it. The aim is to determine whether the gene plays a 
causal role in the production of the behavior of interest. One advantage of this technique 
over lesioning is that it is spatially precise; only the relevant genes are altered and healthy 
knockout mice appear to develop “normally”. Similar to lesions, however, one cannot 
treat knockout mice as normal mice simply lacking a gene. The absence of the gene 
across the animal’s developmental trajectory may impact its overall phenotype, including 
its morphological, biochemical, physiological and behavioral properties. Some of these 
changes may be verified post-mortem but others may go undetected. Gene knockouts 
thus do not provide clean interventions, which is why causal claims about the roles of 
genes in behavior are often generically phrased (e.g., “plays some role” in the behavior of 
interest).  
 Drugs can also be used to alter the activity of neurons by modifying the activity of 
transmembrane receptors and ion channels in the whole brain or selected brain areas. 
Drug infusion via a cannula, a thin tube directly inserted into the brain, compared to 
intraperitoneal and intravenous drug injections, affords an investigator the greatest spatial 
and temporal control of the available options for drug delivery. Drugs can be infused at a 
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precise location at the exact moment during a cognitive task when the investigator wishes 
to alter activity in that area. Despite these advantages, this method is still spatially and 
temporally crude. If too little drug is used, it may not diffuse sufficiently so as to 
facilitate or block neuronal activity in the desired location; if too much is used, it may 
diffuse beyond the intended area and alter neuronal activity outside of the desired 
location. While getting the drug concentration and amount of drug just right is critical, 
determining the right concentration and rate of delivery usually involves trial and error. 
Additionally, an investigator can only verify during post-mortem examination if the 
cannula was in the right location during the experiment.  
 Optogenetics is the newest addition to the stock of intervention strategies available to 
neuroscientists. First developed and described by Karl Deisseroth and colleagues 
(Boyden et al. 2005), optogenetic techniques involve two steps. First, an animal that 
expresses opsin DNA in a selected brain area must be created, either by inserting an 
engineered opsin DNA-virus vector directly into neurons in that brain area or genetically 
engineering an animal that expresses opsin DNA in that region. This measure programs 
these neurons to synthesize light sensitive opsin proteins that embed in the membranes as 
ion channels. An investigator can then take these animals, run them through experimental 
paradigms and deliver optical stimulation via a chronic implant directly to these neurons 
at the desired moment. The channels open in response to this stimulation, resulting in 
immediate changes in ionic concentrations that either activate (depolarize) or inactivate 
(hyperpolarize) these neurons.  
 Optogenetics has been described as a revolutionary intervention technique because it 
has none of the limitations of the traditional techniques described above and several 
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major advantages (See for example Häusser 2014; Bickle 2016). In contrast to lesions 
and drug infusions, the technique is relatively non-invasive, only requiring a cannula 
insertion to allow for delivery of the virus vector and/or optical stimulation. Moreover, 
the effects are reversible—neural activity in a brain area is understood to return to normal 
after optical stimulation is shut off. It is also temporally and spatially precise; an 
investigator can turn a restricted population of neurons on or off with millisecond 
precision while an animal engages in a cognitive task. So, not only does the intervention 
purportedly directly hit its intended target, if there are observable changes in the 
behaviors of interest they can be immediately detected. For all of these reasons 
optogenetics has been touted as “bring[ing] neuroscience closer to causality” 
(Adamantidis et al. 2015, 1207) than previous techniques. Furthermore, the techniques 
have effectively changed standards for publishing research in systems and behavioral 
neuroscience. Including at least one optogenetic experiment in a research study aimed at 
establishing causal links between neural circuits and behavior has become, over the past 
10 years, a desired if not required benchmark for publication (See for example Bickle 
2016).  
 No one would deny that the development of optogenetic techniques—the ability to 
control neurons with light—is a revolutionary and exciting achievement independent of 
how the techniques are ultimately used. The question of interest to me in this paper, 
however, is whether optogenetic techniques alone can revolutionize those areas of 
neuroscience into which the technique has come to be widely used. John Bickle has 
described the methodological strategy in these areas of neuroscience as that of “intervene 
cellular/molecularly and track behaviorally” (2006, 425). Although Bickle made this 
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claim over 10 years ago, well before the onset of the optogenetic revolution in 
neuroscience, this “reduction-in-practice” strategy, as Bickle dubbed it, remains 
dominant. In other words, with few exceptions, research using lesions, gene knockouts 
and drug infusions historically has focused on testing causal hypotheses about the role of 
a single brain area, neural circuit, synapse, cell or molecule in a single set of changes in 
behavior. Rarely in such research studies do scientists investigate changes upstream or 
downstream of the area, circuit or synapse in which they intervene. In other words, they 
do not know the impact of these interventions on brain areas intermediate between those 
areas in which they disrupt activity and the changes in behavior they observe. This does 
not, however, stop them from causally linking neural activity to behavior on the basis of 
data produced using such interventions.  
 It is also uncommon for investigators in these areas of neuroscience to closely analyze 
or describe changes in behaviors over and above those changes in behavior they are 
trying to produce. For example, John Krakauer and colleagues claim that while 
“technique-driven neuroscience” claims to be addressing broad scale questions, like 
“How does the brain generate behavior?”, investigators in this area refuse to engage in 
the “careful dissection of behavior into its component parts and subroutines”. (2017, 
481).” Jacqueline Sullivan (2010, 2014) voices similar concerns, pointing to the fact that 
investigators deploying the intervention techniques described above are often not 
concerned with the component cognitive processes that are involved in the production of 
the behavioral effects under study. She regards this as an impediment to explanatory 
progress because discovering how the brain gives rise to behavioral functions requires 
knowing how to parse and classify those behaviors.  
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 In response to these criticisms it may be granted that single research studies require an 
investigator to focus on testing a restricted set of causal hypotheses and that this 
sometimes means they must constrain their inquiry to a single brain area and a single set 
of behaviors. Yet, the problem is that the causal claims emanating from neuroscience 
following the rise of optogenetic techniques have been anything but modest. Michael 
Häusser (Adamanitis et al. 2015, 1207) expresses a widespread and popular belief that 
optogenetic techqniques are “powerful tools for making causal links between elements of 
neural circuits and behavior—in that we can prove both necessity (by inactivating 
neuronal populations) and sufficiency (by activating the same neurons).” If anything, 
optogenetics has increased confidence that criticisms of reductionist methodologies are 
misguided.  
 Are the critics wrong? Neuroscientist György Buzsáki claims that optogenetics has 
gone through an “initial hyper-enthusiastic phase” in which investigators have been 
making “outrageous claims about the novel method’s power and specificity” but this has 
yet to give way to a “maturational stage” in which investigators come to understand “the 
objective and reliable values of the method” (Adamanitis et al. 2015, 1208). Although 
Buzsáki indicates that this maturational stage will require “hard work”, he says nothing 
about the nature of the kind of labor required. This is where I think the critics get things 
right—that the strategies that might propel neuroscience into and through this 
maturational stage require a change in methodology and perspective. As I argue in the 
remainder of this paper, a recent research study nicely exemplifies the kind of 
multipronged strategy likely to be successful.  
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3. Optogenetics and “Off-Target Effects”. The research study that I focus on here arose 
out of an earlier study that it is relevant to briefly describe. In the original study, 
neuroscientist Bence Ölveczky and his research team at Harvard trained several groups of 
rodents on a motor skill learning task (Kawai et al. 2015). Before each training session 
they deprived rats of water and then placed them into a box containing a lever. When the 
rats pressed the lever twice in short secession (700 ms apart), they received a water 
reward. Across 5-7 training sessions each lasting ~1 hour in duration, the rats learned the 
required motor sequence.  
 Once Ölveczky and colleagues observed that the paradigm produced robust learning, 
they took one group of rats and lesioned the primary motor forelimb cortex (PMFC) prior 
to training. They took another group and lesioned the PMFC after training. They 
observed that rats that underwent PMFC removal before training were subsequently 
unable to learn the motor sequence. In contrast, rats in which the PMFC was removed 
after training could perform the task as well as they had before PMFC removal. Ölveczky 
and colleagues interpreted these data as indicating that the PMFC is causally implicated 
in learning the motor sequence rather than in executing it.  
 In an effort to determine whether these findings were robust across different 
techniques for intervening in PMFC activity, Ölveczky and colleagues decided to conduct 
a comparative study (Otchy et al. 2015). They trained three separate groups of rats in the 
motor sequence paradigm and conducted three different intervention experiments. In one 
group of rats they injected 100 nanolitres (nl) of the GABAA-agonist muscimol via 
cannula directly into the primary forelimb motor cortex (PMFC) opposite the dominant 
paw—a measure designed to temporarily activate inhibitory neurons in this brain area, 
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thus shutting down excitatory activity. This group exhibited “marked drops in 
performance” on the task and “disrupted paw kinematics” (Otchy et al, 2015, 359) insofar 
as they could not make the requisite fine motor movements with their paws to execute the 
required motor sequence. In a second set of experiments, Ölveczky’s team lesioned the 
PMFC in a group of rats, and allowed them to heal for at least 5 days after surgery. When 
these rats were returned to the task context, their performance was observed to be 
comparable to their pre-lesion performance, which was consistent with findings from the 
first study described above (Kawai et al. 2015). In the third set of experiments, a group of 
rats expressing the optogenetic activator Chrimson in PMFC were trained on the task. On 
the first lever press after these rats had reached asymptotic performance, Ölveczky and 
colleagues used a light stimulus to activate PMFC neurons in “the hemisphere 
contralateral to the dominant paw” (Otchy et al. 2015, 359). They observed that 
optogenetic stimulation correlated with an immediate decrease in task performance and a 
disruption in the ability to move the paw so as to elicit the required motor sequence. 
Undertaking this comparative study, Ölveczky and colleagues found that whereas 
permanent removal of PMFC via lesioning had no impact on motor sequence execution 
the two forms of transient disruption of PMFC activity used, including optogenetics, did. 
Data obtained using drug infusions and optogenetics suggested that the primary forelimb 
motor cortex is causally involved in successful execution of the motor task, whereas data 
obtained using lesions suggested that it is not.  
  How might this discrepancy between permanent and transient interventions be 
interpreted? One obvious response would be to reject the data from the lesioning 
experiments because optogenetic techniques purportedly offer superior spatial and 
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temporal control and the observed disruptions in behavior were robust across two 
different intervention techniques (i.e., drug infusion and optogenetic manipulation) rather 
than observed using only a single technique (i.e., lesioning). Ölveczky and colleagues did 
not do this, because they believed they had adequately controlled for potential confounds 
in the lesioning studies. Specifically, they claim, “the discrepancy could not be explained 
by experience-dependent relearning in lesioned animals because the skills recovered their 
idiosyncratic pre-lesion form without any intervening practice” (Otchy et al. 2015, 359). 
Another potential response to the discrepancy would be to question the generalizability of 
the result. In other words, just because differences between permanent and transient 
interventions were observed in one neural system in one animal model with respect to a 
single behavior, does not mean that such discrepancies would be observed in other 
systems.  
 Ölveczky and colleagues, however, did not stop at a single comparative study. They 
sought to determine if transient and permanent inactivations of a brain structure involved 
in courtship song learning in zebra finches resulted in a similar discrepancy. In these 
experiments, after they allowed juvenile birds to learn to produce courtship songs by 
memorizing and vocally mimicking adult zebra finches, they disrupted excitatory 
projections to the hyperstriatum ventral pars caudalis (HVC), an essential component of 
the song control circuit, to determine the impact on learned vocalizations. In one set of 
experiments they lesioned a sensorimotor nucleus upstream of HVC, the nucleus 
interfacialis (Nif), and in another they injected muscimol into Nif to transiently inhibit 
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excitatory activity.1 They found that permanent lesions of Nif did not impact learned 
birdsong (the birds’ songs were similar to pre-lesion) but transient inactivations did. 
These data lent support to the more general claim that transient and permanent 
inactivations of neural activity may yield contradictory information about the causal role 
those neurons normally play.  
 Ölveczky and colleagues’ explanation for the observed differences between transient 
manipulations like optogenetics and permanent manipulations like lesioning is that the 
former have what they dub “off-target effects”. Given that brain circuits are massively 
interconnected, taking a single brain area momentarily off-line likely perturbs the ability 
of other interconnected circuits to perform their normal functions. Using a single 
transient intervention thus makes it difficult to attribute the behavioral effects to that 
brain area.2 As Ölveczky and colleagues put the point, “transient circuit manipulations 
may have their own interpretive difficulties that stem from acute effects on the 
independent functions of non-targeted circuits” (Otchy et al. 2015, 362).   
 The underlying aim of Ölveczky and colleagues’ research study was to determine if 
the impressive causal claims linking neural circuits to behavior that have been made on 
																																																								
1In another study, Roberts and colleagues (2012) demonstrate that optogenetic 
stimulation of HVC correlates with juvenile zebra finches being unable to learn birdsong 
from an adult tutor.  
 2Ölveczky and colleagues also aim to demonstrate by means of a neural network 
simulation, which is part of the same research study, that homeostatic regulation of neural 
activity after lesioning likely contributes to recovery of function in lesioned animals.  		
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the basis of optogenetic tools are warranted or not. Into the vast sea of enthusiasm for 
these techniques, Ölveczky and colleagues inject a healthy dose of skepticism. More 
importantly, the study reveals something interesting about the kinds of strategies that may 
ultimately be successful in propelling neuroscience towards the goal of understanding 
how nervous systems give rise to behavior.   
 
4. Progress and Pluralism. An experiment is ideally supposed to leave an investigator 
epistemically better off than she would have been had she never run that experiment. 
Improving one’s epistemic situation by means of an experiment requires that the 
experiment be reliable or capable of producing data requisite to adjudicate among 
competing hypotheses about a phenomenon of interest. One valuable way to understand 
reliability is in terms of severity (Popper 1962, 1979; Mayo 1991, 1996). According to 
Deborah Mayo, a severe test of a hypothesis is a test that very likely “would not yield [] a 
passing result” for a hypothesis if that hypothesis was indeed false (1991, 529). As Mayo 
acknowledges, empirical tests are rarely if ever maximally severe. Rather, experiments 
may be regarded as situated on a continuum between 0-severity and maximal severity. 
Increasing the severity of a test requires, on her view, the use of error-correcting or error-
reducing strategies.  
 Implementing such strategies, of course, requires that an investigator have an 
awareness of the kinds of errors to which a test may be subject. Yet, as Ölveczky and 
colleagues’ study nicely illustrates, developing an awareness of these errors within the 
confines of a single experiment itself may be difficult, especially when one aims to 
establish a causal claim about a causally complex system. In such instances, the relevant 
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questions become: (1) What is the right approach for getting a handle on the errors if 
there are any? and (2) How might those errors be minimized?  Ölveczky and colleagues 
are clearly interested in both of these questions, and they use what I regard as a two-
pronged pluralistic strategy in order to answer them. On the one hand, this strategy is 
methodologically pluralistic (See also Pratt and Prather 2016; Südhof 2015) and on the 
other, theoretically or conceptually pluralistic. These features set it apart from the vast 
majority of research studies being undertaken in interventionist neuroscience today. I 
want to consider each component of this strategy in turn.   
 Ölveczky and colleagues could have taken the now well-trodden path in interventionist 
neuroscience and used optogenetic techniques to intervene in neural activity in the PMFC 
to determine the impact on learned motor behavior. Had they done this, they likely would 
have concluded on the basis of the rodent experiments that the PMFC was causally 
implicated in the execution of the motor task. Similarly, if they had only blocked Nif in 
zebra finches using a pharmacological intervention, they would likely have concluded 
that this brain area was causally implicated in the elicitation of learned birdsong. Using a 
combination of methods, old and new, to test the same causal hypothesis in both sets of 
experiments, they discovered discrepancies in the data that prompted them to carefully 
scrutinize the methods and assess their severity. Because lesioning techniques have been 
in use for many years and their error characteristics are more or less known, Ölveczky 
and colleagues used available methods of error-reduction to ensure that the lesioning 
experiments were (as severe as possible) tests of the causal hypotheses under 
consideration. In the case of transient manipulations, like optogenetics and 
pharmacology, Ölveczky and his team used a different strategy. They humbly 
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acknowledged that the error characteristics of these techniques are not well known and 
that, given the current state of knowledge about the brain, they were uncertain what 
measures could be taken to reduce these errors.  
 In attempting to explain the discrepancy between transient and permanent intervention 
techniques, Ölveczky and colleagues also do something that “current studies” that “focus 
on only one circuit and one behavior” (Häusser 2015, 339) do not do. Specifically, they 
shift their perspective from those brain areas they investigated in their study to a 
consideration of the broader neural circuitry in which those areas are embedded. In doing 
so, they generate potentially testable hypotheses as to the downstream consequences of 
acute circuit manipulations. They also generate hypotheses as to the nature of the 
homeostatic mechanisms that come on-line when a brain area is permanently lesioned 
and use computational approaches to test these hypotheses. What they do, I contend, is 
complement their methodological pluralism with “perspectival pluralism”.3  
 William Wimsatt’s understanding of a perspective nicely captures what I have in 
mind. According to Wimsatt, “perspectives involve a set of variables that are used to 
characterize systems or to partition objects into parts” and they inform “the characteristic 
ways in which those observers” who adopt them “interact causally with [a] system” 
(Wimsatt 2007, 227; See also Giere 2003). Different scientists take different theoretical 
																																																								
 3In fact, it may indeed be more accurate to say that they take a methodologically 
pluralistic approach because they are already thinking about their objects of study from a 
plurality of different ontological or conceptual/theoretical vantage points. All that is 
important for my purposes is that these two kinds of pluralism are mutually informing.       	
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perspectives on those systems they are interested in understanding, and oftentimes when 
a scientist works in a single area of neuroscience in which a single perspective is 
dominant, she views that system from that perspective. As I explained in Section 2 above, 
historically those areas of neuroscience that use intervention techniques to link neural 
circuits to behavior have been committed to a “reduced” perspective on the brain, 
behavior, and the relationship between the two. Although there are certainly exceptions—
Ölveczky and his collaborators, for example—there is widespread resistance among 
scientists working in this research area and philosophers who find the “intervene 
cellularly-molecularly-track-behaviorally” approach unproblematic (e.g., Bickle 2006, 
2016) to embrace different theoretical perspectives on the systems being investigated 
(See Krakauer 2017; Sullivan 2010, 2014). Ölveczky and colleagues’ study, however, 
nicely illustrates the pitfalls of adhering to a single perspective and why it is antithetical 
to progress. It is not clear how a scientist who adopts a single theoretical perspective on a 
complex causal system will be able to ensure that she is subjecting those hypotheses to 
severe tests, as there might be unknown confounding variables over which she is not 
imposing control. What is potentially gained by adopting multiple different perspectives 
on the brain and nervous system is an awareness of the potential confounding variables as 
well as clues for how to design more reliable experiments.  
 Of course, Ölveczky and colleagues’ approach may be criticized for failing to be 
thoroughly pluralistic. Kraukauer and colleagues, for example, emphasize the importance 
of the perspectives of “organism-level thinkers who develop detailed functional analyses 
of behavior, its developmental trajectory and its evolutionary basis” (2017, 481) for 
forging links between neural activity and behavior. Sullivan (2010, 2014), in contrast, 
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emphasizes the value of engaging in task analyses for individuating cognitive capacities 
and determining what areas of the brain are responsible for bringing them about. It is 
likely that a combination of different approaches will be required in order to make 
experimental tests of causal hypotheses linking the brain to behavior more severe.   
 
5. Conclusion. Optogenetic techniques have spurred a revolution in neuroscience. Yet, 
the power of these techniques to establish causal links between the brain and behavior is 
contingent on understanding how the techniques work and their limitations. Ölveczky and 
colleagues’ 2015 study provides good grounds for thinking that such understanding may 
only be achieved if “reduction-in-practice” neuroscientists cultivate, what Hasok Chang 
aptly refers to as “humility” (2012, 255). Specifically, they need to recognize the value of 
methodological and perspectival pluralism for identifying the benefits and limitations of 
novel experimental techniques no matter how powerful at first blush these techniques 
appear to be.  
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